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RELIEF REQUESTED
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's determination that Appellee should not
be held in contempt for violating Appellant's visitation rights In so doing, Appellant seeks
a published ruling by this Court as to whether parents in divorce situations, where minor
children and visitation are involved, have a duty to know and understand and comply with
the most recent statutory version governing visitation.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(h)(2004).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Are the Court's Conclusions of Law clearly erroneous?
Citations to Determinative Statutes, Rules and Cases: See Standard of
Reviewsection.
Standard of Review:

This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's

conclusions of law under a correction of error standard. See Groberg v.
Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68 P.3d 1015,1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v.
Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139-40 (Utah App. 1989). This standard mandates
that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial
court. See Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002).
2.

Did the Court err in not holding Appellee in contempt for failing to be
aware of the governing visitation statute even where the same denies
statutory visitation to the noncustodial parent?
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Standard of Review:

This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's

conclusions of law under a correction of error standard. See Groberg v.
Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68 P.3d 1015,1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v.
Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139-40 (Utah App. 1989). This standard mandates
that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial
court. See Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002).
3.

Parents in divorce situations with children subject to visitation should
have a duty to know and obey the latest version of the visitation
statute-and the Court should express a duty in this regard.
Standard of Review:

This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's

conclusions of law under a correction of error standard. See Groberg v.
Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68 P.3d 1015,1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v.
Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139-40 (Utah App. 1989). This standard mandates
that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial
court. See Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Appellant is not aware of any determinative Constitutional Provisions.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 (2004)

4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-33(5) (2004)

6, 7, 8, 10
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This matter, on appeal, appears to be one of first impression. Appellant is not
aware of any Utah law bearing directly upon the issues in question
This case overall involves a rather lengthy and difficult divorce case where there
have been numerous issues and problems through the years

One of the recurring

problems has been Appellee's patternistic violation of Appellant's visitation rights. This
appeal involves one such violation

As set forth with the required citations below, this

particular violation of visitation by Appellee involves the visitation on President's Day
Holiday in February of 2002. Appellee delivered the parties' minor child for visitation two
days later than required by statute. Appellant filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause as
a result of the missed visitation. At the hearing on Appellant's Order to Show Cause,
Appellee claimed that she should not be held in contempt because she was relying on an
outdated version of the visitation statute and therefore did not have the intent necessary
to be held in contempt. The trial court excused her conduct. This appeal followed.
Course of the Proceedings
As set forth herein, this appeal does not involve the entire and rather lengthy divorce
matter. It involves only the trial court's ruling from a hearing on Appellant's Order to Show
Cause involving missed visitation.
Disposition of the Trial Court
Also as set forth herein, the trial court ruled that because Appellee was relying on
an outdated version of the visitation statute, she did not have the requisite willfulness
necessary to hold her in contempt.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Appellant and Appellee are the natural parents of a minor child, Gabnelle
Hardy, dob: May 22, 1992 (R. 50-52).

2.

Appellant is the non-custodial parent and Appellee is the custodial parent
(R 365-373)

3.

Appellant was entitled to visitation with the parties' minor child over the
President's Day Holiday in February of 2002 (R. 365-373; R 1185, p. 11).

4

Specifically, Appellant was entitled to visitation from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to
Monday at 7:00 p.m. "unless the holiday extends for lengthier period of time
to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled." (R. 365-373; R.
1185, p. 11; see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35);

5.

Appellee delivered the parties' minor child on Sunday at 6:00 p.m. (R. 1185,
p. 14).

6.

Thereafter, Appellant brought an Order to Show Cause for missed visitation.
(R. 1038-1040).

7.

The Order to Show Cause was heard on or about May 24, 2004. (R. 1185),

8.

Appellee admitted to the facts as set forth herein, but testified that she was
relying upon an old, outdated version of the statute and, under her version,
she delivered the parties' minor child properly for visitation. (R. 1185, pp. 2829).1

1

Appellee feigned ignorance of the most recent statute at the hearing before the trial court She
feigned this ignorance even though she was apparently aware that the statute had been modified in other
particulars It is important to note here that a letter was admitted into evidence at the hearing in this
matter which indicated that Appellee was aware that the statute had been amended (R 1174)
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9

The trial court concluded that Appellee did, indeed, deny Appellant visitation
(R 1185, pp 50-52)

10

However, the trial court further held that the denial was not willful given the
fact that Appellee was relying upon an outdated version of the statute and
that she, in fact, delivered the parties' minor child for part of the visitation
Id

11

The trial court made the following findings of tact
a

Defendant denied Petitioner effectively two (2) days of visitation over
the Presidents' Holiday, 2002,

b

Defendant relied upon an outdated version of the visitation statute
that, by Presidents' Holiday, 2002, had been modified to expand the
visitation on said holiday;

c.

Defendant actually delivered the parties' minor child for visitation at
approximately 6 00 p m on the Sunday of Presidents' Holiday, 2002,

d.

Said delivery was consistent with the outdated version of the statute,

e.

Subsequent amendments to the statute expanded visitation on
Presidents' Holiday, as follows:
§ 30-3-35(g)(n) Washington and Lincoln Day
beginning at 6 00 p m on Friday until 7 00 p m
on Monday unless the holiday extends for a

Additionally, Appellee successfully used an amendment to this very statute on a prior occasion to defeat a
prior Order to Show Cause involving a denial of visitation (R 387 90 391 99, 400-11) Additionally, and
of equal importance, this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the amendment to the statute in
question went into effect nearly two years prior to the denial of visitation in this matter (See Appendix II,
attached hereto)
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lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial
parent is completely entitled
(R. 1178-1180)
12

The trial court made the following conclusions of law
a

Even though Defendant denied Plaintiff visitation, because Defendant
was relying upon an old version of the statute and did in fact deliver
the parties' minor child for part of the visitation, the Court cannot
conclude that Defendant's denial was wilful,

b

Defendant cannot, therefore, be held in contempt;

c.

Plaintiff is entitled to make up visitation which shall consist of one
week of uninterrupted visitation during the summer of 2004;

d.

The Court's Order to Show Cause is therefore dismissed;

e.

Both parties shall bear their costs and attorneys' fees.

Id. See Addendum 1, attached hereto.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
The law requires that the custodial parent, in this case Appellee, have the parties'
minor child ready for pick up at the beginning of a visitation period. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-33(5) (2004) ("the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the
time he is to be picked up . . . ."). Additionally, the decree of divorce between the parties
calls for visitation to be consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 (2004). This statute calls
for visitation for Washington and Lincoln Day "beginning at 6 p.m on Friday until Monday
at 7 p m

" There is no question, in fact all parties agree, that Appellee did not comply
-6-

with this statute. There is no provision in the law that would excuse a custodial parent for
denying visitation by reliance on an old and outdated version of the statute. As a result,
the trial court's conclusions of law are clearly erroneous.
POINT I!
As set forth above, a custodial parent has a duty to have the parties' minor children
ready for pick up at the beginning of a visitation period. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-33(5)
(2004) ("the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the time he is to
be picked up . . . ."). The legislature often changes statutes and the visitation statute is
fairly susceptible to change over time. The evidence adduced at the hearing indicates that
Appellee was aware that there are and were periodic changes to the visitation statute. As
a result, a custodial parent should be required to familiarize himself or herself with the
visitation statute and comply therewith. As a result, the trial court erred by not holding
Appellee in contempt for failing to be aware of and follow the governing visitation statute.
POINT III
This Court should express a duty on parents in divorce situations where minor
children are subject to visitation to know and obey the most current and governing visitation
statute. Individuals have such duties to know the law in other contexts. It would seem
reasonable and rational to require that in circumstances such as those involved in this case
that a party violating visitation should have a duty to know and follow the statute and
should not be able to claim ignorance as an ally.

-7-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ARETHETRIAL COURTS CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW CLEARLY ERRONEOUS?
This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's conclusions of law under a correction
of error standard See Groberg v Housing Opportunities, Inc , 68 P 3d 1015,1017 (Utah
App 2003), Bailey v. Call, 767 P 2d 138, 139-40 (Utah App 1989)

This Standard

mandates that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court
See Roderick v Ricks, 54 P 3d 1119 (Utah 2002)
In this case, as in all divorce cases where visitation has been awarded to the noncustodial parent, the law requires that the custodial parent, in this case Appellee, have the
parties' minor child ready for pick up at the beginning of a visitation period. See Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-33(5) (2004) ("the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time
at the time he is to be picked up . . ."); see also Charlseworth v. State of California, 793
P.2d 411, 414-15 (Utah App. 1990) (Orme, J , dissenting) ("[the custodial parent] has the
legal duty to make the children available for reasonable visitation")

Additionally, the

decree of divorce between the parties calls for visitation to be consistent with Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-35 (2004) (See Addendum II, attached hereto) This statute calls for visitation
for Washington and Lincoln Day "beginning at 6 p m on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m.. .
J?

As such, Appellee had a duty to make the parties' minor child available for visitation
no later than 6 p.m. on the Friday of the Washington and Lincoln day (as set forth in the
statute), 2002

The facts are clear in the record, as well as the trial court's findings of
-8-

fact-Appellee failed to fulfill her statutory obligation with respect to visitation She did not
make the parties' minor child available for visitation as required under the visitation statute
that governed in 2002
The trial court made the following conclusion with respect to this issue
Even though Defendant denied Plaintiff visitation, because
Defendant was reiymg upon an old version of the statuie and
did in fact deliver the parties' minor child for part of the
visitation, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant's denial
was willful.
The trial court concluded that there had been a violation of the order and of the
statute, but concluded that such violation was not willful. In Von Hake v Thomas, 759 P 2d
1162, 1172 (Utah 1988), the supreme court unequivocally required that trial courts make
explicit findings on each of the following substantive elements of contempt: "the person
cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally
failed or refused to do so. . . ." Thus, based on Von Hake, a person can be held in
contempt if the person intentionally failed to comply (willful) or refused to comply
In the present case, the three elements of contempt have been satisfied*
1

Appellee knew and was aware that she was required (had a duty) to make
the parties' minor child available for visitation pursuant to court order and
statute;

2

Appellee had the ability to make the child available for visitation; and

3.

Appellee refused to comply with the order and statute.

As a result, Appellee was clearly in contempt and the trial court's conclusions of law are
therefore clearly erroneous.
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POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO HOLD
APPELLEE IN CONTEMPT FOR BEING UNAWARE
OF THE CURRENT VISITATION STATUTE
This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's conclusions of law under a correction
of error standard See Groberg v Housing Opportunities, Inc , 68 P 3d 1015, 1017 (Utah
App 2003), Bailey v Call, 767 P 2d 138, 139-40 (Utah App 1989)

This standard

mandates that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court See
Roderick v Ricks, 54 P 3d 1119 (Utah 2002)
This appears to be a question of first impression in this state and in other
jurisdictions

The question is whether a divorced parent, with minor children subject to

visitation, should be held to be aware of the current and governing visitation statute
As set forth above, In this case, as in all divorce cases where visitation has been
awarded to the non-custodial parent, the law requires that the custodial parent, in this case
Appellee, have the parties' minor child ready for pick up at the beginning of a visitation
period See Utah Code Ann § 30-3-33(5) (2004) ("the custodial parent shall have the child
ready for parent-time at the time he is to be picked up

"), see also Charlseworth v.

State of California, 793 P 2d 411, 414-15 (Utah App 1990) (Orme, J , dissenting) ("[the
custodial parent] has the legal duty to make the children available for reasonable
visitation") Additionally, the decree of divorce between the parties calls for visitation to be
consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 (2004)

This statute calls for visitation for

Washington and Lincoln Day "beginning at 6 p m on Friday until Monday at 7 p m

-10-

Appellee feigned ignorance of the most recent statute at the hearing before the trial
court. She feigned this ignorance even though she was apparently aware that the statute
had been modified in other particulars. It is important to note here that a letter was
admitted into evidence at the hearing in this matter which indicated that Appellee was
aware that the statute had been amended. (R. 1174). Additionally, Appellee successfully
used an amendment to this very statute on a prior occasion to defeat a prior Order to Show
Cause involving a denial of visitation.2 (R. 387-90; 391-99; 400-11). Additionally, and of
equal importance, this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the amendment to the
statute in question went into effect nearly two years prior to the denial of visitation in this
matter. (See Appendix II, attached hereto).
Appellant requests that, in this case of apparent first impression, this Court set a
standard for divorced parents with minor children subject to visitation to know and observe
the latest version of the visitation statute. That standard would place a duty upon divorced
parents with minor children subject to visitation to know and be awaire of and to comply
with the most recent and governing version of the visitation statute. While there is no
authority on this particular question, there are other contexts in which a person or party is
held to a duty to know the law. See, e.g., Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Sterling H.
Nelson & Sons, Inc., 552 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1976) ("The defendant had a duty to know
what the laws were . . . ."); Board of Education of Nebo School Dist. V. Jeppson, 280 P.
1065,1069 (Utah 1929) ("Generally speaking, all men are presumed to know the law, and,

2

Ironically, on that occasion Appellent was claiming that Appellee denied him visitaiton. Appellee
argued that the very statute in question had been amended and that under the amendment Appellant was
not entitled to the visitation that he claimed. Clearly, therefore, Appellee was aware that the statute had
been amended and her feigned ignorance is disingenuous.
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generally speaking, this presumption cannot be overcome by proof to the contrary.");
Ferguson v. Allen, 26 P. 570 (Utah 1891) ("Officers of election are, like other persons,
presumed to know the law . . . .").
Appellant is not advocating a large or onerous burden in this matter. Appellant is
merely advocating that a parent, in divorce where minor children are involved and subject
to visitation, keep himself or herself aware of and apprised of any changes to the statutes
governing visitation. This Court can take judicial notice that Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 was
enacted in 1993 and was amended in 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003. Thus, in a twelve year
period, this statute has undergone four amendments.

It would seem likely that the

legislature will continue to modify this statute. This statute is reasonably short and fairly
easy to understand. Consistent, therefore, with the above case law indicating a person's
duty to know the law, Appellant requests that this Court express such a duty with respect
to the visitation statute on divorced parents who have minor children subject to visitation.
Appellant further submits that expressing such a duty will be in the best interests of
children in divorce as it will require parents to remain current with visitation changes and
to comply therewith.
If this Court finds that such a duty exists, which it should, then the conclusions of
the law of the trial court are erroneous. Stated differently, it matters not that Appellee was
relying upon a different, outdated, version of the statute. She had a duty to know the
current version of the statute and her reliance on an outdated version should not and
cannot shield her from contempt.
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POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD EXPRESS A DUTY ON
PARENTS IN DIVORCE CONTEXTS WHERE
CHILDREN ARE SUBJECT TO VISITATION TO
KNOW AND OBEY THE MOST RECENT AND
CURRENT GOVERNING
VISITATION
STATUTE
As set forth above, there are numerous contexts in which an individual is deemed
to have a duty to know the law. See, e.g., Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Sterling H.
Nelson & Sons, Inc., 552 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1976) ("The defendant had a duty to know
what the laws were . . . ."); Board of Education of Nebo School Dist. V. Jeppson, 280 P.
1065,1069 (Utah 1929) ("Generally speaking, all men are presumed to know the law, and,
generally speaking, this presumption cannot be overcome by proof to the contrary/');
Ferguson v. Allen, 26 P. 570 (Utah 1891) ("Officers of election are, like other persons,
presumed to know the law . . . .").
In the present case, it does not seem that it would be a stretch or even a departure
from present law and governing statutes to require that a person be aware of and comply
with the latest statute governing visitation. In Jeppson, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
all men are presumed to know the law and cannot use ignorance or mistake as an ally in
avoiding this duty. Appellee has done jus>t this and she has succeeded in so doing, at least
at the triai court ievei.
There is no dispute in this matter that Appellee denied visitation to Appellant. There
is no question as to the time, date and duration of the denial. There is no dispute that
there was no offer to make up any missed visitation until such time as Appellant scheduled
the subject Order to Show Cause. Appellant testified that she relied on an old version of
-13-

the statute that was different than the version of the statute that governed visitation at that
time. In other words, Appellee successfully claimed ignorance of the law as a defense.
If ignorance of the law is not a defense under general circumstances (See Union
Pacific, 552 P.2d at 651; Jeppson, 280 P. at 1069; Ferguson, 26 P. 570), it should not be
allowed as a defense when there is a specifically defined situation (divorce and visitation)
and a specific statute. In other words, all a party has to know is the visitation statute and
not the iaw generally.
As set forth above, Appellant is not advocating a large or onerous burden in this
matter. Appellant is merely advocating that a parent, in divorce where minor children are
involved and subject to visitation, keep himself or herself aware of and apprised of any
changes to the statutes governing visitation. This Court can take judicial notice that Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-35 was enacted in 1993 and was amended in 1997, 2000, 2001 and
2003. Thus, in a twelve year period, this statute has undergone four amendments. It
would seem likely that the legislature will continue to modify this statute. This statute is
reasonably short and fairly easy to understand. Consistent, therefore, with the above case
law indicating a person's duty to know the law, Appellant requests that this Court express
such a duty with respect to the visitation statute on divorced parents who have minor
children subject to visitation. Appellant further submits that expressing such a duty will be
in the best interests of children in divorce as it will require parents to remain current with
visitation changes and to comply therewith.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court issue a ruling requiring that parents
in this and similar contexts become familiar and remain familiar and comply with the
visitation statute as it currently exists and as it changes over time.
-14-

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court express a
duty of divorced parents with minor children subject to visitation to know and comply with
the most current and governing version of the visitation statute. Appellant further requests
that this Court overturn the trial court's ruling that Appellee could not be held in contempt
and award him his costs and attorney fees and remand for any appropriate and necessary
proceedings. Orai argument requested.
DATED this dl)~tia\/ of April, 2005.

A
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5

P>om parties shall focai then costs and attorneys' lees
ORDER

Based on the loregoing, the Couit s Order to Show Cause dated May 12 2003 is heieby
dismissed

7
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U) the in\ olvement oi the noncustodial pai ent in the school community
lehgious, 01 othei i elated activities oi the child
(]) the availability of the noncustodial paient to caie foi the child when
the custodial paient is unavailable to do so because of woik oi othei
uieumstanees
(k) a substantial and chionic pattern of missing, canceling oi denying
leguiarly scheduled paient time
(1) the minimal duiation of and lack of significant bonding in the
parents relationship pnor to the conception of the child
(m) the parent time schedule of siblings,
(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to trie needs of i nuismg diild
and
(o) any othei criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests
of the child
(3) The court shall enter the leasons underlying its orclei for parent time
that
(a) mcoipoiates a parent tune schedule piovided in Section 30 3 35 or
30 3 35 5, or
(b) provides more or less parent time than a parent time schedule
provided in Section 30 3 35 or 30 3 35 5
(4) Once the parent time schedule has been established, the parties may not
altei the schedule except by mutual consent of the parties or a court order
History C 1953, 30 3 34, e n a c t e d by L
1993, ch 131, ^ 4, 1997, ch 8 0 , ^ 2, 2001, ch
255, ^ 10
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s — The 2001 amend

ment effective Apnl 30 2001 substituted pai
ent time for visitation and made stylistic
changes

30-3-35. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5
to 18 y e a r s of age.
(1) The parent time schedule m this section applies to children 5 to 18 years
of age
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent time schedule, the following
schedule shall be considered the minimum parent time to which the noncus
todial parent and the child shall be entitled
(a) d) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent
or the court from 5 30 p m until 8 30 p m , or
(n) at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday fi om the
time the child's school is regularly dismissed until 8 30 p m , unless
the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(a)(i),
(b) d) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the
entry of the decree from 6 p m on Friday until 7 p m on Sunday
continuing each year or
(n) at the election of the noncustodial parent, Irom the u m e the
child's school is regularly dismissed on Friday until 7 p m on Sunday,
unless the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(b)(i),
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent time, and
changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating
weekend parent time schedule,
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for t h a t
school day,
(e) d) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the
total holiday period extends beyond that time so t h a t the child is free
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from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent
shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period, or
(n) at the election of the noncustodial parent, parent-time over a
scheduled holiday weekend may begin from the time the child's school
is regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend until 7
p.m on the last day of the holiday weekend,
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is
entitled to the following holidays:
d) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate
beginning at 3 p.m until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Martin Luther King, J r beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until
Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends ior a lengthier period of
time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day
school lets out for the holiday until 7 p m on the Sunday before school
resumes;
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled,
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until
11 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until
1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided;
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is
entitled to the following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other
siblings along for the birthday,
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday
until 7 p.m. on Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11
p.m. on the holiday;
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7
p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled,
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A.
weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m.
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the
noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday
until 7 p.m on the holiday;
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until
Sunday at 7 p.m; and
>
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including
New Year's Day, as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas
day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p m , so long as the entire Christmas
holiday is equally divided,
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even
years and the even year holidays m odd years;
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d) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptn e father evei v
year beginning at 9 a m until 7 p m on the holiday.
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adopti\e mothei
every year beginning at 9 a m until 7 p m on the holiday
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be
(1) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent,
(n) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent,
and
(m) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines,
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of
uninterrupted time during the childrens summer vacation hum bchool for
purposes of vacation,
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial
paient's extended parent-time shall be Vz of the vacation time for yearround school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone
visits,
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the
child shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent, and
(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable
duration
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by
either parent concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and
made a part of the parent-time order
History: C. 1953, 30-3-35, e n a c t e d by L.
1993, ch. 131, ^ 5; 1997, ch. 80, ^ 3; 2000, ch.
97, § 1; 2001, ch. 9, *> 50; 2001, ch. 255, ** 11;
2003, ch. 269, ^ 5.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2000 amend
ment, effective March 10, 2000, added Subsec
tions (2)(a)(n), (2)(b)(u), (2)(e)(n), and (3) and
made related changes, revised the piovisions
regarding three day weekends for Human
Rights Day and President's Day in Subsections
(2)(f)(n) and (2)(g)(n), and revised the provi
sions regarding spring break oi Easter holiday
in Subsection (2)(f)(m)
The 2001 amendment by ch 9, effective Apul

30, 2001, substituted ' M a i t i n Luthei King, Ji
Day" for "Human Rights Day' in Subsection
(2)(f )(n) and substituted "Washington and Lin
coin Day" for "President's Day" in Subsection
(2)(g)(n)
The 2001 amendment by ch 255, effective
April 30, 2001, substituted "paient time" for
"visitation" throughout the section
This section has been leconciled by the Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003,
mseited "including New Year's Day" in Subsec
tion (2)(g)(vm) added Subsection (2)(h), and
made changes in subsection designations

30-3-35.5. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children
u n d e r five years of age.
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children under five
years old
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following
schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled
(a) for children under five months of age
d) six hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or
the noncustodial parent preferably
(A) divided into three parent-time periods, and
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or
other environment familiar to the child, and

